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Abstract
The joint evolution of participation and compliance of farmers in a public
VA, along with the evolution of the pollution stock is examined. Replica-
tor dynamics, modeling participation and compliance, are combined with
pollution stock dynamics. Fast-slow selection dynamics are used to capture
the fact that distinct decisions to participate in and comply with the public
VA evolve in di⁄erent time scales. Conditions for evolutionary equilibria
and evolutionary stable strategies regarding participation and compliance
are derived. Depending on the structure of the legislation and auditing
probability, polymorphic equilibria indicating partial participation and par-
tial compliance or monomorphic equilibria of full (or non) compliance could
be the outcome of the evolutionary processes. Multiple equilibria and irre-
versibilities are possible, while convergence to evolutionary equilibria could
be monotonic or oscillating. Full participation and compliance can be at-
tained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation and inspection
probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission level
and the non-compliance ￿ne. Budget constraints associated with monitoring
costs seem to produce polymorphic equilibria.
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Voluntary approaches (VAs) to environmental regulation have been regarded
as alternative instrument to pollution control. They are expected to increase
economic and environmental e⁄ectiveness as well as social welfare, relative
to traditional policy instruments1, since they allow farmers greater ￿ exibil-
ity in their pollution control strategies and have also the potential to reduce
transaction and compliance costs.2 VAs can be classi￿ed into three basic
categories, based mainly on the degree of public intervention.3 Negotiated
agreements that imply a bargaining process between the regulatory body
and a farmer or an industry group to jointly set the environmental goal
and the means of achieving it. Unilateral agreements are environmental
improvement programs prepared and voluntarily adopted by farmers them-
selves. Public voluntary agreements are environmental programs developed
by a regulatory body and farmers can only agree to adopt them or not.
The potentially most serious drawback of VAs is that they leave room
for free-riding. Particularly, in public VA where the attainment of an en-
vironmental target requires collective action, individual farmers may have
incentives not to reduce their emissions but to rely upon other farmers to
carry out the actions necessary to attain the target. Farmers can decide not
to participate in the achievement of the established goal either ex-ante (non-
participation), or ex-post after signing the agreement (non-compliance). It
is possible that free-riding may impede the establishment of a public VA,
or may result in a failure of the agreement because signatory farmers do
not comply with the rules of the VA.4 This suggests some limitations in
1Such as emission taxes, subsidies, or tradeable permit systems etc.
2The theoretical analysis of VAs to environmental regulation has been mainly developed
in the recent decade. See for example the work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1996), Segerson
and Miceli (1998), Segerson and Dawson (2000), Brau et al. (2001), Lyon and Maxwell
(2003).
3Examples of successful public VAs include the EPA￿ s "33-50" program that seeks to
encourage ￿rms in the US Chemical industry to voluntarily reduce the discharges of 17
high-priority toxic chemicals under the background threat of legislation, the "US. Con-
servation Reserve Program" that used cost-sharing and other ￿nancial inducements to
achieve reduction of agricultural pollution through voluntarily participation in soil con-
servation and other erosion control programs and its successor "Environmental Quality
Incentives Program", "Canadian Industry Program for Energy Conservation", the "US
Green Lights" , the "Motor Challenge" programs for industry, as well as the "Golden
Carrot" program for manufactures of highly energy-e¢ cient refrigerators which have been
recently consolidated with the "Motor Challenge" (OECD 1998). While "ProjectXL" and
"Common Sense Initiative" involve negotiation, they also resemble public VAs.
4Despite the presence of apparent incentives to free-ride it is possible to have an equilib-
3the ability of VAs to attain desired targets. In fact there are some reserva-
tions, based on empirical observations, regarding the ability of public VAs
to improve environmental quality as an independent policy tool. Accord-
ing to a report by Environment Canada, industrial sectors that relied solely
on self monitoring or voluntary compliance had a su¢ ciently lower average
compliance rating (60% vs 94%) of those industries which were subject to
federal regulations combined with a consistent inspection program.5 Indeed
without appropriate threats of sanctions or enforcement schemes, there may
be a problem of compliance or uneven application. Both participation in
and compliance with the agreement are important and thus a successful VA
scheme may need to include a mix of voluntary and mandatory features,
to ensure that polluting agents will not only sign the public VA but also
comply with its provisions and established goals.
The present paper studies the long-run structure of a public VA where
the regulator makes an o⁄er to a large number of homogeneous farmers to
reduce nitrate emissions in order to voluntarily attain, by using ￿ exible cost
saving methods, a desired ambient pollution level.6 The type of VA we
study has many similarities with voluntary climate change programs or the
various Energy Star programs.7 If the o⁄er attains full participation, a target
ambient pollution stock is attained. If there is no full participation then
there is a deviation from the target and a positive probability of legislation
through conventional instruments such as direct regulation. Thus limited
participation may trigger regulation. Participating farmers are not directly
observed by the regulator so there could be incentives not to comply. The
regulator tries to deter non-compliance by random auditing and ￿nes to
those found not in compliance with the VA.
The general set up of compliance and auditing developed in this paper
here can be used as a basis in order to gain some insights regarding nitrate
pollution regulation. In particular, a similar type of regulatory framework
can be regarded for the EU Nitrate Directive (91/676/EEC) that aims to re-
rium in which the target is achieved and only a subset of ￿rms in the industry comply with
the agreement￿ s provisions, while the remaining free-ride (Dawson and Segerson, 2001).
5Enforcement vs Voluntary Compliance: An Examination of the Strategic Enforcement
Initiatives Implemented by the Paci￿c and Yukon Regional O¢ ce of Environment Canada,
Report No. DOEFRAP 19983.
6The ￿ exible methods of reducing emissions through the VA program have a weak cost
advantage relative to regulation like, for example, the XL Project or the EPA￿ s 33-50.
7See, for example, OECD (1998).
4duce water pollution caused by nitrates generated from agricultural sources.
The importance of the particular issue lays in the fact that only a minor-
ity of Member States have fully applied the directive and the Commission
has opened a number of infringement proceedings against Member States
for non-implementation. In this context the directive entails two regulatory
frameworks (Article 4): (i) codes of good agricultural practice to be imple-
mented on voluntary basis supplemented where necessary by the provision of
training and information8 and, (ii) a mandatory framework involving oblig-
atory measures to be implemented in action programs for nitrate vulnerable
zones9. Thus the developed general conceptual model of VA and nitrate
pollution generation in this paper can be associated to some extend with
the regulatory framework of the Nitrate Directive.
In modelling the process where farmers decide whether to participate
in the agreement under a probabilistic regulation threat, we adopt an evo-
lutionary framework. The basic characteristic of this framework is that,
although farmers are pro￿t maximizers in the output choice, when it comes
to choosing a strategy regarding participating in the VA, or whether to com-
ply or not, they adopt a more passive decision making and not an explicit
optimizing behavior.10 This more passive decision making is modelled by
an evolutionary process where decisions are taken by comparing the pro￿ts
of a strategy to participate in and comply with the VA, with corresponding
expected pro￿ts of a nonparticipating, non-complying farmer. Successful
strategies are those attaining higher expected pro￿ts and are imitated by
other farmers with a probability proportional to the di⁄erence between cor-
responding pro￿ts. Pro￿t di⁄erentials exercise evolutionary pressures on the
8These codes contain provisions covering issues such as: (a) periods when application
of fertilizers is inappropriate, (b) application of fertilizer to steeply sloping ground, (c)
fertilizer application to water-saturated, ￿ ooded, frozen or snow-covered ground, (d) the
conditions application of fertilizer near water cources, (e) the capacity and construction
of storage vessels for livestock manure and (f) procedures for fertilizer applications.
9Action programs consist of the following mandatory measures: (a) measures prescribed
in the code(s) of good agricultural practice, (b) rules determining time periods where ap-
plication of certain types of fertilizers is prohibited, (c) measures concerning the minimum
acceptable capacity of storage vessels for manure, and (d) limitation in the application of
fertilizers on particular grounds.
10This evolutionary approach might be ecompassing ideas of bounded rationality since it
can be associated with ￿rms￿bounded ability to fully perceive either advantages associated
with ￿ exibilities and cost superiority of the VA, or costs associated with probabilistic ￿nes.
For general presentations of these approaches see for example Nelson (1995) and Conlisk
(1996).
5composition of population of farmers so that more successful strategies in-
crease their share in the total population of farmers. A simple way to model
the movements in the composition of population of farmers regarding partic-
ipation in and compliance with the VA is the use of replicator dynamics.11
We use replicator dynamics as selection dynamics to model in two stages
the evolution of: (i) the decision to sign or not the agreement, and (ii) the
decision to comply or not with the agreement￿ s provisions after signing it.
The use of replicator dynamics allows us to determine evolutionary equi-
libria (EE), which can be related to evolutionary stable (ES) strategies re-
garding participation and compliance.12 We further elaborate on the selec-
tion dynamics by considering the situation where decisions to participate or
not evolve fast, since when the o⁄er is made there is usually a legal time
framework,13 while decisions regarding compliance after participation are
unconstrained and expected to evolve much more slowly. This suggests that
the evolutionary equilibrium composition of farmers regarding participation
is reached faster than the ES equilibrium composition regarding compliance,
implying that selection dynamics operate in a fast-slow dynamics framework.
Our contribution lies in using, for the ￿rst time to our knowledge, an
evolutionary approach with fast-slow selection dynamics to jointly determine
the steady-state equilibrium fraction of signatory and complying farmers, as
well as the corresponding steady-state equilibrium emission stock. Using
this approach we are able to determine "which strategies survive in the long-
run", in the sense of evolutionary stability, de￿ne the structure that a long-
term VA would have, in terms of participation and compliance, and identify
policy rules that might produce desirable VAs.14 Our analysis indicates
that the value and characteristics of the legislation and auditing probability
are of crucial importance for the resulting long-term equilibrium outcome.
Under di⁄erent assumptions about the legislation probability, the fast time
dynamic system can alternatively converge to a polymorphic or monomor-
phic steady state, implying either partial or full (or non) participation in
the public VA. Similarly by choosing the structure of the auditing probabil-
11For de￿nitions, see, for example, Weibull (1995). For applications of this methodology
to common property resources see, Sethi and Somanathan (1998).
12A strategy is ES if it can not be invaded by a mutant strategy. (See for example
Weibull (1995) page 36)
13EPA￿ s National Environmental Performance Track accepts applications twice a year.
14For a similar approach regrading the regulation of a renewable resource, see Xepa-
padeas (2005).
6ity, the regulator can achieve partial or full (or non) compliance. There is a
possibility of unique or multiple EE with potential irreversibilities, while the
convergence to these equilibria could be monotonic or oscillating. If full par-
ticipation and full compliance, are regarded as the desired outcome for the
regulator, they can be attained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain
legislation and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the leg-
islation mandate and the non-compliance ￿ne. Finally we show that under a
limiting budget for ￿nancing auditing inspections, which is partly ￿nanced
exogenously and partly through collected ￿nes, a polymorphic compliance
equilibrium is the most likely outcome.
2 A Model of Agricultural nitrate pollution and
Regulation
Assume an industrial sector consisting of i = 1;2;:::n small and identical
farmers, which operate under competitive conditions and emit into the am-
bient environment. Emissions accumulate in the environment and cause
external damages, which exceed the socially-desirable levels without regula-
tion. The regulator proposes formally a "take-it-or-leave-it" environmental
protection scheme and gives each farmer in the industrial sector a chance
to voluntarily meet an exogenously determined emission level ev. This type
of public VA o⁄ers full ￿ exibility to choose the pro￿t-maximizing and leg-
islative preemptive means of achieving the target and could provide cost
advantages over legislative regulation.
In particular the regulator proposes a long-term "preemptive" public
VA15 to which farmers can only agree or not. If all farmers follow the
agreement then total emissions in the ambient environment will be Ev = nev,
where we assume that the nitrate pollution stock S accumulates according
to:




where E (t) denotes total nitrate emissions at time t due to agricultural
activities, and ’(S (t)) denotes emissions out￿ ows due to natural environ-
mental self cleaning process and environmental feedbacks.
15Such VAs indirectly reduce expected production costs because they reduce the prob-
ability of facing a (more costly) direct regulatory regime (Brau et al., 2001).
7Let, ￿ S(t) be the path of nitrate pollution stock under full participation
and compliance to the agreement. If there is no full participation, a deviation
at time t is expected between the observed and desired nitrate pollution
stock, denoted by ￿S (t) = S(t) ￿ ￿ S(t):16 Participation in the VA does not
imply that a farmer will also comply with its provisions. Thus although
the regulator has full observability of participating farmers, we assume that
simultaneous control of all signatory farmers is prohibitively costly. The
mechanism usually applied to verify compliance and identify compliance
problems, is inspection of randomly chosen signatory farmers. Therefore a
positive ￿S (t) might be the result of either partial participation and non-
compliance by some of participating farmers, or under full participation, the
result of non-compliance by some signatory farmers. It would be intuitive
to assume that from a farmer￿ s point of view the subjective probability of
having legislation introduced at time t depends on the deviation ￿S(t) and
the proportion of participating farmers x(t); or17






< 0 x 2 [0;1] (2)
where !v (t) is a vector of other parameters a⁄ecting the probability of
regulation.18 The probability of regulation would increase due to either an
increase in the deviation ￿S (t) or a decrease in the number of participating
farmers.
We further specify the probability structure, by assuming that the prob-
ability of introducing legislation is common to all farmers and that: p(0;1) =
0; 19 p(￿S;xj￿S > 0;x < 1) > 0; p(￿S;1j￿S > 0) = 0 hold respectively.
That is, if everybody participates, then the deviation is due to non-compliance.
We assume that (￿S (t);x(t)) are observable by the regulator and become
public information, while there is uncertainty regarding the vector !v. farm-
ers can use announced (￿S (t);x(t)) to calculate subjective probabilities,
but there is uncertainty regarding the probability law p(￿S (t);x(t);!v (t));
thus farmers use model (2) as a benchmark for some ￿xed value of the vector
!v:
16We do not consider uncertainty issues.
17Segerson and Miceli (1998) assume a ￿xed legislation probability.
18It may include legislative procedures, transaction costs, etc.
19The possibility of p(0;xjx < 1) = 0; which allows for overcompliance by some ￿rms
so that the target is achieved even if some ￿rms are not participating, is not considered.
The possibility of overcompliance implies the introduction of another strategy, eOC < ev:
8If farmers believe that the only factor that a⁄ects the probability of
legislation is the nitrate pollution deviation ￿S, then the probability can be
simpli￿ed to20




The decision to participate and then comply or not depends on the struc-
ture of pro￿ts. In our model, each farmer produces an output Q and emis-
sions e. The cost function C(Q;e) is a continuous function where CQ > 0,
Ce < 0, CQQ > 0 and Cee > 0. We assume that the VA o⁄ers only a cost
advantage to participating and complying farmers since it deters the intro-
duction of relatively more costly mandatory regulation and allows greater
￿ exibility in the processes of emissions reduction.21 The pro￿t function is
de￿ned as ￿(e) = maxQ fPQ ￿ C(Q;e)g:
At the unregulated equilibrium a farmer chooses emissions eo = argmaxe
￿(e): Therefore when a farmer decides not to participate in the VA, and
continues producing at the pro￿t-maximizing emission level without facing
a legislative mandate, then pro￿ts are de￿ned as ￿N(eo). If a farmer decides
to sign the VA and voluntarily cut emissions at the agreed level ev; then
pro￿ts are ￿v(ev) = maxQ fPQ ￿ Cv(Q;ev)g.
If a farmer decides not to participate in the VA and mandatory legis-
lation is used to introduce either an emission tax ￿; or an emission limit
(performance standard) ￿ e, then its pro￿t function could be de￿ned as:
￿L(e;￿) = max
Q
fPQ ￿ CL(Q;e) ￿ ￿Leg (4)
￿L(e; ￿ e) = max
Q
fPQ ￿ CL(Q;e) : e 6 ￿ eg (5)
In both cases Cv(Q;e) < CL(Q;e) under the cost advantage assumption
of the VA. So under legislation pro￿ts can be de￿ned as ￿L(eL), where
eL (￿) = argmaxe ￿L(e;￿) under taxation, or eL = argmaxe ￿L(e) subject
to e 6 ￿ e, under a performance standard. Under standard assumptions
eL = ￿ e.22
20It seems that ￿S shall always be part of the subjective probability in every case.
If the subjective probability is a function of participation proportion x alone, then the
incentive to participate is not linked with the achievement of the environmental target ev:
21We assume that the VA does not improve a ￿rm￿ s public image and increase consumers￿
goodwill.
22The target ￿ e = eL can be achieved either through taxation, if the tax rate is chosen
9If a participating farmer decides not to comply with the VA and emit at
the unregulated level eo; then there is a possibility that the farmer is caught
after a random inspection. If the non-complying farmer is not inspected then
pro￿ts are ￿N (eo): If caught the farmer is subjected to individual legislation
and a non-compliance ￿ne F: The pro￿ts of a non-complying farmer which
is caught after a random inspection is ￿C(eL;F) = ￿L(eL) ￿ F:
Since eo > eL ￿ ev the structure of costs and pro￿ts imply:
￿o (eo) > ￿v(ev) > ￿L(eL) > ￿C(eL;F)
In the case of non-participation in the agreement the imposition of leg-
islation is probabilistic, therefore the expected pro￿ts of non-participating
farmers are:
E￿N = p￿L(eL) + (1 ￿ p)￿N(eo) ; p = p(￿S;x;!v) (6)
Thus the su¢ cient condition for participation in the VA is
￿v(ev) ￿ p￿L(eL) + (1 ￿ p)￿N(eo) (7)
Let q be the subjective probability that a participating farmer will be
inspected and let z be the proportion of participating farmers that comply
with the terms of the VA. A farmer￿ s subjective probability of being audited
can generally be de￿ned by q (!c); where !c is a vector of parameters. It
is assumed that this function is common for all farmers and can be further
speci￿ed in the following cases.
In the ￿rst case the regulator exercises ￿xed monitoring e⁄ort and makes
a ￿xed number of inspections, say ￿ n per period. The regulator announces
this policy and precommits to a certain auditing probability, which is known
by the polluters. In this case the audit probability is ￿xed, or23
q (!c) ￿ ￿ q (8)
An alternative assumption would be that the regulator exercises variable
such that eL (￿) = ￿ e is a solution to maxe ￿L(e;￿); or through a performance standard ￿ e:
23This is a common assumption in the enforcement literature in environmental eco-
nomics (e.g. Malik, 1993; Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Stranlund
and Dhana, 1999).
10monitoring e⁄ort, dependent on state variables of the problem observed by
the regulator.24 One such variable is the deviations from the desired nitrate
pollution stock ￿S; and/ or the share of violators 1 ￿ u; u 2 [0;1] detected
during an audit. The regulator increases the monitoring e⁄ort if the stock
or the share of violators is increasing. This policy can be regarded as a
type of no full commitment - or partial commitment - auditing policy on
the regulator￿ s part. The regulator might, for example, not audit individual
farmers if the deviation ￿S is su¢ ciently low, but start inspections if the
deviation increases beyond a certain level.25 The farmers are made aware of
the results of the inspections, through public announcements and/or private
communications, and perceive that if the deviation or the share of violators
increases, more monitoring e⁄ort will be exercised and thus the subjective
probability of being audited increases. In this case the probability q can be
speci￿ed as stock dependent auditing probability:
q = q (￿S;!c); q
0
(￿S;!c) > 0; q (0;!c) = 0 (9)
where !c is a vector of parameters similar to !v:
If farmers use the observed u as an estimate for their perceived z; that
is they set u = z; a compliance dependent auditing probability is de￿ned as:
q = q (z;!c); q
0
(z;!c) < 0; q (1;!c) = 0;q (0!c) > 0 (10)
It is expected that the value of q (0) will be large but not unity since not
every farmer is audited26 even if nobody complies, while if everybody is
complying the subjective probability is q (1) = 0.
If (9) and (10) are taken together, a general formulation of the subjective
audit probability with joint dependence on compliance and stocks would be:
q = q (z;￿S;!c) (11)
In this context the expected pro￿ts of a participating, non-complying farmer
24In the enforcement literature, variable monitoring e⁄ort is usually related to ￿rm
speci￿c variables (e.g. Malik, 1990; VanEgteren and Weber, 1996).
25Grieson and Singh (1990), Khalil (1997), and Franckx (2002) analyze no commitment
frameworks. An environmental regulator chooses which ￿rm to inspect without observing
￿rms￿actions but after observing ambient pollution.
26This can be associated with a binding budget constrained for inspection costs.
11are:
E￿N = q￿C(eL;F) + (1 ￿ q)￿N(eo) (12)
and the su¢ cient condition for complying with the agreement￿ s provisions
is:
￿v(ev) ￿ q￿C(eL;F) + (1 ￿ q)￿N(eo) (13)
Given the above framework we explore how imitation and adaptation of
behavior, resulting in higher pro￿ts, determine which strategies (participate
or not/comply or not) will survive in the long run. We model the selection
dynamics that can be used to determine the ES strategies by replicator
dynamics.
3 Replicator Dynamics as Selection Dynamics
Assume that at a given time t the industrial sector consists of two groups of
farmers, each group following di⁄erent strategy concerning participation in
the public VA. Let x(t) denote the proportion of farmers participating in the
agreement, while xN(t) the remaining proportion of non-signatory agents at
time t; with x(t) + xN(t) = 1.
In every time period dt there is a positive probability adt that a farmer
i, following a certain strategy, will compare its pro￿ts and consequently its
strategy, with the corresponding pro￿ts and strategy of another randomly
chosen farmer j.27 If farmer i perceives that the farmer j￿ s pro￿ts are su¢ -
ciently higher, then it switches its strategy. There is imperfect information
concerning the di⁄erence in the expected pro￿ts of the two strategies, since
there is uncertainty in the law determining the probability of legislation and
possible uncertainty regarding the true cost functions. In this context the
higher the pro￿ts di⁄erence is, the higher the probability is that farmer i
will change strategy. Particularly, farmer i that did not participate in the
public VA at time t, might decide to switch strategy and sign the agree-
ment if its expected pro￿ts E￿N, de￿ned by (6), are less than the pro￿ts
￿v(ev) of the participating farmer. Therefore, the probability that a non-
participating farmer will change its strategy and ultimately sign the public
27In motivating the replicator dynamics we follow Gindis (2000).




￿ [￿v(ev) ￿ p￿L(eL) ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿N(eo)] for ￿v(ev) > E￿N
0 for ￿v(ev) ￿ E￿N
The expected proportion of farmers that decide to participate in the
public VA at time t + dt is given as:




Ext+dt = xt + ￿dtxt￿(￿v(ev) ￿ ￿ ￿(e))
where ￿ ￿(e) denotes average pro￿ts for the whole population, de￿ned as:







L = (￿N(eo) ￿ ￿L(eL)) are the pro￿t losses under the non-
participating strategy when legislation is imposed.
The population of farmers in the industrial sector is assumed to be large
and thus we can replace Ext+dt by xt+dt. Moreover, if we subtract from both
sides the term xt, divide by dt and ￿nally take the limit as dt ! 0, we derive
an equation that describes the behavior of the fraction x over time:
_ x = ￿￿xt ￿
￿v(ev) ￿ ￿ ￿(e)
￿
This is the replicator dynamics equation, which indicates that the fre-
quency of the signatory strategy increases when its pro￿ts ￿v(ev) are above
the average pro￿ts ￿ ￿(e). If we substitute from (14) then the replicator
dynamics equation is rewritten as:




v = (￿N(eo) ￿ ￿v(ev)) are the pro￿t losses under the participat-
ing, complying strategy.
It has already been mentioned that participation in the VA does not
imply that a farmer will also comply with its provisions. We assume that in
choosing between compliance or not farmers imitate successful strategies, as
in the choice of participation strategy, by collecting (incomplete) information
13regarding expected pro￿ts of non-complying farmers. Let z(t) denote the
proportion of farmers complying with the agreement, while zN(t) the remain-
ing proportion of non-complying farmers at time t; with z(t) + zN(t) = 1.
After following the same conceptional framework, the replicator dynam-
ics equation for the compliance strategy is de￿ned as:
_ z = ￿￿zt ￿
￿v(ev) ￿ ￿ ￿V N(e)
￿
where ￿ and ￿ correspond to ￿ and ￿ above, and ￿ ￿V N(e) are the average
pro￿ts for the whole population of signatory farmers.28
Then the replicator dynamics equation for the complying strategy is:








C = (￿N(eo) ￿ ￿C(eL;F)) are the pro￿t losses under the non-
complying, participating strategy when both legislation and ￿ne are im-
posed.
Steady states (S-S) (or stationary points or rest points, or critical points)
of the replicator dynamics equations (15) or (16) can be used to de￿ne evo-
lutionary equilibria. Following standard stability classi￿cation an (S-S) is
stable (or Lyapunov stable) if no small perturbation from the (S-S) induces
a movement away from (S-S), it is asymptotically stable (AS) if it is stable
and small perturbations induce a movement back towards (S-S), or to put
it di⁄erently if the solution of the replicator dynamic equation tends to the
(S-S) from initial conditions in the neighborhood of (S-S) as t ! 1. We will
de￿ne as evolutionary equilibrium (EE) an AS steady state under the repli-
cator dynamics (Gindis (2000). The (S-S) is globally asymptotically stable
(GAS) if it converges to the (S-S) independent of initial conditions for any
initial state in the open interval (0;1) 29: A stable (S-S) is a Nash equilibrium
of the game de￿ned in terms of two farmers following strategies of participa-
tion or non-participation, or compliance or non-compliance. Furthermore,
if a strategy ^ x is an evolutionary stable (ES) strategy then it corresponds
to an EE under the replicator dynamics. Conversely, a strategy ^ x is an ES
strategy if it is a strongly stable equilibrium point of the replicator dynamics
equation, where strong stability means that if ^ x is contained in a convex hull
28Where ￿ ￿V N(e) = z￿v(ev) + (1 ￿ z)[q￿C(eL;F) + (1 ￿ q)￿N(eo)]:
29We can not request convergence from the boundaries 0 and 1 since they are invariant.
14of the strategy simplex, all strategies in the neighborhood of ^ x converge to ^ x
(see, for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003).30 Since GAS equilibria can
be associated with the notion of strong stability, GAS steady states under
the replicator dynamics can be regarded as re￿ ecting ES strategies.
The evolution of the emission stock is a⁄ected by the decisions to partici-
pate in the agreement and further comply with its provisions and established
goals. Therefore the nitrate pollution stock dynamic equation (1) can be
further speci￿ed as:
_ S = nfx[zev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q)] + (1 ￿ x)eog ￿ ’(S) (17)
where EeL(q) = qeL+(1￿q)eo are the expected emissions of a non-complying
but participating farmer. Finally, (17) can be further speci￿ed by assuming
that the emissions out￿ ows term is linear, implying that ’(S) = bS with
b > 0.
The combination of the replicator dynamics equations (15) or (16) with
an emission dynamic equation (17) can be used to develop a uni￿ed dynam-
ical system which characterize, participation, compliance and the associated
movement of the nitrate pollution stock.
4 Fast - Slow Selection Dynamics in the Evolution
of Public Voluntary Agreements
The purpose of introducing di⁄erent time scales in the replicator dynamics
framework is to capture the fact, observed in real situations, that when a VA
of that type is o⁄ered, the composition regarding participation is ￿nalized
relatively fast. Since farmers have to decide whether to accept the o⁄er
within a relatively small time interval, determined by legal procedures, we
expect evolutionary pressures to work relatively fast. On the other hand
compliance behavior is not constrained by a time framework so we expect
evolutionary pressures to operate more slowly relative to the participation
case. This implies that the rate of change of x with respect to time is ￿large￿










￿ ￿ j_ zj.
30A convex hull of a set A is the smallest convex set containing A: For example, the
convex hull of three noncollinear points is the triangle with these points as vertices.
15The above argument implies that in (15) and (16) we can set ￿￿ = 1 and
￿￿ = " where " is a small positive parameter. Assuming that the natural
system evolves in a time scale which is comparable to the slow compliance
variable, then our dynamic system can be written in a fast time scale as:
dx
d￿
= f1 (x;S) (18)
dz
d￿
= "f2 (z;S) (19)
dS
d￿
= "f3 (x;z;S) (20)
System (18)-(20) is the fast time system (FTS).31 If fast time is scaled
such that ￿ = t="; so that d￿ = dt=" then the dynamics system character-
izing participation, compliance and nitrate pollution accumulation in slow
time can be written:
"_ x = f1 (x;S) (21)
_ z = f2 (z;S) (22)
_ S = f3 (x;z;S) (23)
The problem de￿ned in the dynamical system (21)-(23) is a singular
perturbation problem.32 The general method for analyzing it, is to consider
the systems at the limit " ! 0: If the solutions satisfy certain regularity
conditions for " = 0; then solutions for small " can be approximated by
the solutions for " = 0: By taking " = 0 in system (21)-(23) we obtain
the reduced system, or else known as slow-time system (STS), where the
equation 0 = f1 (x;S) provides, if it can be solved for x; the equilibrium
participation rate for ￿xed level of S; as:
x = h(S) (24)
The solutions of (24) are equilibria of the FTS (18)-(20), de￿ned for " ! 0
and denoted by hj (S); j = 1;:::;J.33 For the stable equilibria from the set
31Where fi; i = 1;2;3 represent the right hand sides of (15), (16) and (17) respectively.
32For the analysis of problems in a fast-slow time framework see, for example, Wasow
(1965, Chapter X) or Sastry (1999, Chapter 6).
33Where J is the number of these equilibria.
16of equilibria of (24), the slow variables evolve as:
_ z = f2 (z;S) (25)
_ S = f3 (h(S);z;S) (26)
The analysis of the dynamic system (25) and (26) can be used to determine
the long-run ES compliance and nitrate pollution stock (z￿;S￿): Then the
long-run ES participation in the VA will be determined as h(z￿;S￿):34
5 Long-Run Structure for a Public VA
The conceptual framework developed above is used to determine the long-
run structure regarding participation in and compliance with a public VA.
Since the long-run structure is determined as a stable equilibrium of the
replicator dynamics equation, it has the property of a stable EE. To illus-
trate the importance of the structure of legislation and auditing probabilities
in determining the long-run structure for the public VA, we classify the fol-
lowing analysis according to the characteristics of these probabilities.
5.1 Participation Decision and Evolutionary Participation
Equilibria
The decision regarding participation in a public VA is reached faster and it
is a⁄ected by the structure of the subjective probability of introducing legis-
lation. The legislation probability can either depend on the nitrate pollution
stock solely or depend jointly on nitrate pollution stock and proportion of
participating farmers.
5.1.1 nitrate pollution Stock Dependence of the Legislation Prob-
ability
Assume that the subjective probability of introducing legislation depends
only on the nitrate pollution deviation ￿S. In the fast time participation
system (FTPS) the observed emission stock S and the deviation ￿S, are
34In more technical terminology the dynamic system (25) and (26)
is de￿ned on the stable two-dimensional manifold (or union of) M = ￿
(z;S;x) : g (x;z;S) = 0 : x
F
j (z;S)
is stable in FTS
￿
: Solutions of the slow system (21)-(23) at
least locally are attracted to this manifold.
17both regarded as ￿xed and parameters. As a consequence the legislation
probability is ￿xed, implying that p = p(￿S).
Under this de￿nition the slow time compliance nitrate pollution system
(STCPS), is de￿ned as:














_ S = nfx[zev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q (z;￿S;!c))] + (1 ￿ x)eog ￿ bS (29)
The solution of the replicator dynamics equation (27) provides the S-S
participation rates x￿, for ￿xed level of S; which correspond to an EE. Two
S-S exist, x￿
1 = 1 and x￿
2 = 0, implying either full or non-participation in the
public VA.
The derivative of (27) with respect to x de￿nes the stability condition:
d_ x
dx
= (1 ￿ 2x)￿ (30)
where ￿ = [p(￿S)￿￿N
L ￿￿￿N
v ]. There is a critical probability value, de￿ned
as ^ p(￿S), that sets ￿ = 0 and behaves as a bifurcation parameter.35 The
sign of the expression ￿, and therefore the stability of the steady states,
depend on the magnitude of the ￿xed legislative probability p(￿S) relative
to the critical value ^ p(￿S). Speci￿cally, if the regulator announces and
commits to a legislative probability higher than the critical value, then ￿ >
0. On the other hand, if p(￿S) < ^ p(￿S), then ￿ < 0.
Under this de￿nition it follows that:




















In the ￿rst case, farmers perceive that the introduction of the legislation
is highly likely. Therefore farmers prefer the pro￿t loss ￿￿N
v under the
public VA to the higher pro￿t losses ￿￿N
L , realized if legislation is imposed.
Consequently, all farmers participate in the public VA and x￿
1 = 1 is GAS.
Furthermore the ambient nitrate pollution stock is equal to the industrial
emission target Ev. In the second case, the legislation mandate appears less
likely and farmers can maintain the unregulated pro￿ts ￿N(eo). Therefore
35Where ^ p(￿S) =
￿N(eo)￿￿v(ev)
￿N(eo)￿￿L(eL) < 1, since ￿N(eo) ￿ ￿v(ev) < ￿N(eo) ￿ ￿L(eL).
18no farmer has the incentive to participate in the public VA and receive
reduced pro￿ts by ￿￿N
v ; so x￿
2 = 0 is GAS.
These ￿ndings can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under an emission stock dependent legislative probability





then there is full participation in the public VA and x￿
1 = 1 is the GAS evolu-




; then there is non-participation
in the public VA and x￿
2 = 0 is the GAS evolutionary equilibrium. By the
strong stability property of the GAS steady states, participation or non par-
ticipation are ES strategies, for the appropriate value of the subjective legis-
lation probability.









Thus, the higher the legislative emission eL
36 is set by the regulator, the
lower is the critical probability value ^ p(￿S). There is a trade-o⁄ between
the announced legislative set emission level and the commitment to a given
legislation probability value. Through a stricter legislation the range of leg-
islation probability values that induce participation becomes wider, allowing
the regulator to achieve the stable EE outcome by committing to a lower
legislation probability.
5.1.2 nitrate pollution Stock and Participation Dependence of
the Legislation Probability
Assume that the subjective probability of introducing legislation depends
jointly on nitrate pollution deviation ￿S and the participation proportion
x. Under p = p(￿S;x) and (11) the STCPS is de￿ned as:














_ S = nfx(￿S)[zev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q(￿))] + (1 ￿ x(￿S))eog ￿ bS (34)
36As noted above, a target eL can be attained either through emissions taxes or emission
limits. From our assumptions it follows that ￿
0
L (eL) < 0:
19The fast time dynamic equation (32) de￿nes two monomorphic S-S: x￿
1 =
1 and x￿
2 = 0; as well a polymorphic critical point x￿
3(￿S) 2 (0;1) that is
de￿ned by ￿ = [p(￿S;x￿
3)￿￿N
L ￿ ￿￿N
v ] = 0: The stability condition for
these S-S is given by:
d_ x
dx




There is a critical probability value ^ p(￿S;x￿
3) that sets ￿ equal to zero
and corresponds to the critical point x￿
3(￿S). Furthermore if x < x￿
3 then
p(￿S;x) > ^ p(￿S;x￿
3) and ￿ > 0; while if x > x￿
3 then p(￿S;x) < ^ p(￿S;x￿
3)






















The FTPS converges to the polymorphic EE x￿
3, implying that only a
sub-group of polluting farmers participate in the public VA in the long-run.
This happens because, in the case of full participation p(￿S;1j￿S > 0) =
0 holds, giving farmers an incentive not to participate in the VA, when
participation is already high. On the other hand, p(￿S > 0;0) ! 1, giving
farmers an incentive to participate in the agreement when participation is
very low.
These ￿ndings can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under a legislative probability that depends jointly on par-
ticipation proportion and nitrate pollution stock the participation system con-
verges to a GAS polymorphic EE, implying partial participation to the public










Under the threat of a stricter legislative regulation, the participating pro-
portion increases, shifting the polymorphic x￿
3 steady state upwards, closer
to the full participation critical point, x￿
1 = 1. Therefore through proper
design of the legislation mandate the regulator can induce the majority of
farmers to participate in the VA.
205.2 Compliance Decisions and Evolutionary Compliance Equi-
libria
Assume that the regulator has set p(￿S) > ^ p(￿S) and thus the full par-
ticipation S-S x￿
1 = 1 is an EE and an ES strategy in the fast time.37 We
examine now the second level of decision, which is to comply or not with
the VA. Substituting the GAS steady state, x￿
1 = 1; the slow-time system is
de￿ned in general terms as:







_ S = nfzev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q (z;￿S;!c))g ￿ bS (38)
The system has a hierachical structure, if the audit probability q is in-
dependent of the nitrate pollution stock S, implying that the S-S and the
stability properties of the replicator dynamics (37) can be determined ￿rst
and then used to determine the nitrate pollution stock S-S of equation (38).
In the following we examine how alternative assumptions about the structure
of the auditing probability a⁄ect the compliance EE and nitrate pollution
stock, given the full participation decisions.
5.2.1 Fixed Auditing Probability
Assume that the regulator is committed to a ￿xed auditing probability.
Participating farmers know exactly the probability ￿ q under which they may
experience pro￿t losses ￿￿N
C, if caught violating the agreement. Based on
this knowledge they choose their evolutionary strategy of whether or not to
comply.
Under this assumption there are two monomorphic S-S of the replicator
dynamic satisfying the equilibrium condition _ z = 0 of the (37), implying
either full compliance z￿
1 = 1 or non-compliance z￿
2 = 0 with the agreement.
The stability condition is determined by:
d_ z
dz







. There is a critical probability value
l
q that sets
37It makes no sense to examine the S-S when x
￿
2 = 0; is the ES strategy since non-
participating ￿rms are not expected to do "self-regulation".
21￿ = 0. In particular, if ￿ q >
l
q then ￿ > 0 and if ￿ q <
l
q then ￿ < 0: Thus the
stability conditions of the replicator dynamic becomes:
If ￿ q >
l
q then d_ z
dz jz￿
1=1< 0 and d_ z
dz jz￿
2=0> 0
If ￿ q <
l
q then d_ z
dz jz￿
1=1> 0 and d_ z
dz jz￿
2=0< 0
The _ S = 0 isocline de￿nes the corresponding nitrate pollution stock
equilibrium. If ￿ q >
l
q then full compliance, z￿
1 = 1; is the EE with S￿
1 =
nev








1: In this case the nitrate




nfev ￿ EeL(￿ q)g
￿
EeL(￿ q)
fev ￿ EeL(￿ q)g
= AS ￿ B
where A < 0 and B < 0: The STCPS converges to a GAS monomorphic
S-S.38
The above conclusions can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under a ￿xed auditing probability the compliance-nitrate
pollution system converges to a GAS monomorphic S-S. If ￿ q 2 (
l
q;1) then
there is full compliance with the public VA and the S-S z￿
1 = 1 is the ES






then there is non-compliance with the public VA and
the S-S z￿













The higher the non-compliance ￿ne is, the lower the critical probability
value
l
q is.39 Thus, by an appropriate choice of the ￿ne, and provided that
this choice is politically feasible, the regulator can lower the number of
random inspections and achieve full compliance, as well as the desired goal
Ev; with less monitoring expenses.
38For details see the Appendix.
39This is the evolutionary analogue to Franckx (2002) result, which indicates that the
only role the ￿ne plays is that when it increases the equilibrium inspection probability is
reduced.
225.2.2 Compliance Dependent Auditing Probability
Under an auditing probability which is dependent on the fraction of the
complying farmers, de￿ned as q(z); z￿
1 = 1 and z￿
2 = 0 are EE for (37).
Furthermore an additional EE z￿
3 2 (0;1) may exists, which also satis￿es
the equilibrium condition _ z = 0. This S-S de￿nes a critical probability value
^ q(z￿
3) such that ￿ = [^ q(z￿
3z)￿￿N
C ￿ ￿￿N
v ] = 0:
In this case the stability condition is de￿ned as:
d_ z
dz




Due to (10), it holds that ￿ > 0 for z < z￿
3 since q(z) > ^ q(z￿
3) and ￿ < 0 for
z > z￿
3 since q(z) < ^ q(z￿
3). It can be easily seen that the monomorphic EE














= ￿ > 0
Under full compliance the regulator may respond with a reduced or even
zero number of random inspections, due to condition (10). This gives par-
ticipating farmers an incentive to violate the agreement. On the other hand,
under non compliance the value of q (0) is su¢ ciently high, this gives par-
ticipating farmers an incentive to comply with the agreement￿ s provisions.











the replicator dynamic converges to a polymorphic EE, implying that only
a sub-group of participating farmers complies with the public VA.







1 = 1 and z￿
2 = 0 respectively, with
dz
dS
= b=(nfev ￿ EeL(q(z)) + (1 ￿ z)(@q(z)=@z)(eL ￿ eo)g)
Thus in general the _ S = 0 isocline de￿nes a non linear relationship on the
(z;S) space, which could be monotonically decreasing, or having decreasing
and increasing parts (See Figure 1)40. As shown in the Appendix the S-S













23de￿ned by the intersection of z = z￿
3 and the _ S = 0 isocline, with S￿
3 =
n[z￿
3ev + (1 ￿ z￿
3)EeL(q(z￿
3))]=b is unique and GAS in the interval (0;1);
with monotonic or oscillating approach dynamics. Therefore, in this case
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4 Under a compliance dependent auditing probability, partial












Therefore increasing the ￿ne, increases the equilibrium compliance pro-
portion and shifts the polymorphic steady state upwards, closer to the full
compliance critical point. So under the appropriate adjustments of the ￿ne,
compliance in the left side neighborhood of z￿
1 = 1 is a GAS evolutionary
equilibrium.
[Figure 1]
5.2.3 Emission Stock Dependent Auditing Probability
Assume that the auditing probability depends on the deviation from the
established environmental goal. In the slow time scale the observed emission
stock and thus the auditing probability q(￿S) are no longer ￿xed. In this
case the equilibrium condition _ z = 0 for the replicator dynamic equation
(37) de￿nes the two monomorphic S-S z￿
1 = 1 and z￿
2 = 0; as well as a
potential third one z￿
3 2 (0;1); determined by a critical emission stock level







The type of the evolutionary equilibrium for the STCPS depends on the
relationship between the critical emission stock level ^ S, the full compliance
emission stock level S￿
1 and the non-compliance stock level S￿
2. In this case
the nitrate pollution stock isocline _ S = 0 is a non-linear, monotonic curve
with negative slope,41 while the critical emission stock level ^ S corresponding
to _ z = 0 is a vertical line in the (z;S) space. If S￿





@z (eL￿eo)g 7 0; supporting the potential existence of decreasing and increasing
parts for the _ S = 0 isocline.








24intersection of ^ S with _ z = 0 corresponds to z￿
3 2 (0;1) and the STCPS has
three isolated S-S, while if ^ S < S￿
1 < S￿
2 or ^ S > S￿
2 > S￿
2 the STCPS has two
isolated S-S (see Figure 2a). The properties of these EE are summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Under an emission stock dependent auditing probability the
CPSTS could converge to either a polymorphic or monomorphic compliance
evolutionary equilibrium. If ^ S < S￿
1 < S￿
2 then there is a GAS full compli-
ance EE, and z￿
1 = 1 is the ES strategy. If S￿
1 > ^ S > S￿
2 then there is a
GAS partial compliance EE and z￿
3 2 (0;1) is the ES strategy with oscillating
approach dynamics. If ^ S > S￿
1 > S￿
2 then there is a GAS no compliance EE
and z￿
2 = 0 is the ES strategy.









the critical emission stock level declines with the level of the ￿ne and the
vertical isocline moves closer to the full compliance emission stock level in
￿gure 2b. Moreover the polymorphic equilibrium point moves closer to the
monomorphic steady state point A, implying that with the proper design of
the non-compliance ￿ne the regulator can induce a larger share of partici-
pating farmers to comply.
[Figure 2]
5.2.4 Joint Dependence of Auditing Probability on Compliance
and nitrate pollution Stock
Assume that the auditing probability depends jointly on nitrate pollution
stock and the proportion of complying farmers. Under q = q(￿S;z) the
condition _ z = 0 for (37) de￿nes two equilibria, z￿
1 = 1 and z￿
2 = 0; and a
possible third one which is implicitly de￿ned by an isocline l(S) with the
property:










@q(￿S;z)=@z > 0; that re￿ ect the farmers￿beliefs about the
variability of the auditing probability value due to changes in the levels of
25the state variables S and z: If participating farmers perceive that changes
in the nitrate pollution stock can not a⁄ect the auditing probability value,
then @q(￿S;z)=@S = 0 and the auditing probability depends only on the
compliance proportion and the isocline is parallel to the horizontal axis as
in case 5.2.2. If participating farmers perceive that @q(￿S;z)=@z = 0, then
the auditing probability depends only on the nitrate pollution stock and the
isocline is vertical to the horizontal axis as in case 5.2.3. Thus the case of
joint dependency of the auditing probability on S and z is a generalization
of the two previous cases. It can be shown that the results are similar
to the more speci￿c cases above and can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 6 Under an auditing probability with joint dependence on com-
pliance levels and nitrate pollution stock, the evolutionary equilibrium of the
CPSTS regarding compliance could be monomorphic, or polymorphic with
possible multiple steady states. The type of the prevailing EE depends mainly
on the slope and position of the z = l(S) isocline. The ￿atter the isocline is,
the more likely it is that the EE equilibrium implies partial compliance which
is the ES strategy in the case of a unique GAS evolutionary equilibrium. The
more steeper the isocline is the more likely it is that EE equilibrium implies
full compliance as the ES strategy
For details see Appendix and Figures 3 and 4.
The EE outcome can be further a⁄ected through the non-compliance
￿ne, since it determines the position of the isocline z(S). The higher the
￿ne is, the more participating farmers tend to comply with the VA. Conse-
quently the regulator can shift the isocline upwards, bringing the polymor-
phic equilibrium point closer to the monomorphic steady state, through the
announcement of a su¢ ciently higher ￿ne F.
[Figures 3 and 4]
5.2.5 Compliance Equilibria with a general legislation probability
Under a legislation probability jointly dependent on nitrate pollution devia-
tion ￿S and participation proportion x the EE steady state x￿
3(￿S) in the
fast time implies partial participation:To analyze the evolution of compliance
26and nitrate pollution stock we de￿ne the slow time system by substituting
x￿
3(￿S). Therefore under (11) the CPSTS is:







_ S = nfx￿
3(￿S)[zev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q(z;S))] + (1 ￿ x￿
3(￿S))eog ￿ bS (45)
Under p = p(￿S;x), the nitrate pollution stock isocline z = k(S) :
_ S = 0 could be monotonic curve with negative slope or have increasing and
decreasing parts, depending on the type of the audit probability. In this
case the _ S = 0 isocline takes the following general form:















ev ￿ EeL(q(z;S)) = ￿ev
L
As previously the EE (z￿;S￿) of the CPSTS is highly dependent on the
structure of the auditing probability q. Based on the conceptual framework
developed in the previous section we conclude that:
Proposition 7 Under a participation and nitrate pollution stock dependent
legislation probability and a ￿xed or state variable dependent auditing proba-
bility, the EE equilibrium implies partial participation in the public VA and
full, non or partial compliance of the participating subgroup of farmers.
The CPSTS could be either characterized by a unique equilibrium or
multiple equilibria and irreversibilities, with the ￿nal outcome crucially de-
pending on initial conditions.42
6 The Impact of Auditing Costs and Budget Con-
straint on Evolutionary Equilibria
In this section we explicitly introduce a budget constraint that determines
a maximum number of inspections. We assume that the available budget
for auditing is exhausted in each period and that it consists of two com-
ponents. An amount K exogenously determined by the regulator and the
42Only in the case of a ￿xed audit probability the _ S = 0 isocline is clearly a monotonic
curve with negative slope and the CPSTS has a unique EE.
27sum of noncompliance ￿nes F collected from participating farmers found in
non-compliance after a random inspection.43 Thus the budget is partially
￿ne ￿nanced and is determined endogenously. Particularly under (11) the
￿ exible budget the period t can be de￿ned as:
Bt = Kt + q(z;￿S;!c)(1 ￿ z)F
The number of realized audits and therefore the auditing probability
are dependent on the available budget of the regulatory body, implying
that the auditing probability is endogenous to the budget. An increase
in the budget allows the a higher number of inspections and increases the
auditing probability. Thus a more general formulation for the subjective
audit probability (11) can be written as:
q = q (z;￿S;B;!c) (46)
where
@q
@B > 0 with
@2q
@B2 < 0 and 0 <
@q
@B < 1. Moreover, we assume that
q = q (z;￿S;0;!c) = 0; implying that no inspection can be conducted if
monitoring expenses cannot be covered.44
Under this de￿nition the available budget can take the general form:
Bt = Kt + q(z;￿S;B;!c)(1 ￿ z)F (47)
or Bt = B(K;S;z;F) (48)
In this case even if the auditing probability is regarded as independent
of z,45 it is eventually dependent on the compliance proportion, through the
sum of collected ￿nes, since it is de￿ned as ￿ q = q(B) with Bt = B(K;z;F).46
After taking the total derivative of (47) the relationship between the budget




@S > 0 while @B
@z < 0; denoting that the available budget
increases either as K; F or ￿S increases and decreases as z increases.
Under the budget constraint and the general de￿nition of the legislation
43The noncompliance ￿ne F is assumed to be ￿xed even though it could depend on
compliance proportion and/or the pollution stock.
44No assumption is made about covering the monitoring costs in the following period.
45This corresponds to the case ￿ q, as developed in the previous sections.
46The same holds under q = q(￿S;B(K;S;z;F)). In this case the CPSDS behaves as
in the q (z;￿S) case.
28and audit probability, (2) and (??), the CPSTS is de￿ned as:














_ S = nfx(￿S)[zev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q (￿))] + (1 ￿ x(￿S))eog ￿ bS (51)
Thus, the CPSTS behaves as in the case where q = q (z); or q =
q (z;￿S): Based on the conceptual framework developed in the previous
sections we conclude that under a ￿ exible partially ￿ne ￿nanced budget
constraint, the behavior of the system is similar to the behavior under state
dependent auditing probabilities.
The most notable di⁄erence between the present and previous CPSTS is
that under the ￿ exible budget described above, there can be no commitment
to a ￿xed auditing probability and polymorphic EE are expected instead of
monomorphic. Of course one component of the budget is exogenous then
commitment to a certain ￿xed amount K is equivalent with commitment to
a certain ￿xed auditing probability




3;F)) and compliance fraction z of the GAS poly-

















It follows that as the amount K increases, the critical audit probability
value decreases and the compliance proportion increases. Speci￿cally, the
second derivative implies that the as the amount K increases, the number
of ￿nancial feasible inspections increases, inducing more participating farm-
ers to comply with the VA at the equilibrium. Under these circumstances
the polymorphic steady state z￿
3 shifts upwards, closer to the full compli-
ance critical point. However, full compliance can not be achieved given the
repelling property of the full compliance S-S.
297 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the long-run structure of a public
VA regarding participation and compliance of farmers and to specify certain
characteristics that a VA should possess in order to induce the majority of
or even all polluting farmers to participate in and comply with the VA. In
this context we examine the evolution of participation in and compliance
with the public VA, along with the evolution of nitrate pollution stock.
Individual polluting farmers￿decisions about whether or not to participate
in and comply with the VA were based on the evolutionary processes of
comparing expected pro￿ts associated with the di⁄erent decisions, and were
modelled by replicator dynamics operating in fast and slow time scales.
The main ￿nding is that the structure of the legislation and auditing
probability, the levels of legislative emissions and non-compliance ￿nes are
the main factors characterizing the evolutionary equilibria and evolutionary
stable strategies. If the legislation probability is ￿xed in fast time, and is
set higher than a critical value, then the equilibrium outcome is monomor-
phic implying that all the farmers participate in the agreement. On the
other hand, if the legislation probability depends jointly on emission stock
and participation proportion, the evolutionary equilibrium is polymorphic,
implying partial participation. In this case the regulator can lead the equi-
librium outcome su¢ ciently to full participation through the proper design
of the legislation mandate and particularly through the magnitude of the
legislative emissions eL:
By committing to a ￿xed auditing probability, higher than a critical
value, the regulator can achieve full compliance of participating farmers.
The same outcome can be achieved under certain initial conditions when
the auditing probability depends on the nitrate pollution stock and the com-
plying proportion. In this case however the dynamic system describing the
evolution of compliance and the nitrate pollution stock can alternatively
converge to a partial compliance steady state, either monotonically or os-
cillating. Under certain conditions the compliance-nitrate pollution stock
system is characterized by multiple equilibria and irreversibilities. The in-
troduction of a budget constraint in covering monitoring costs, with partial
￿nancing through the collection of ￿nes, leads the compliance-nitrate pol-
lution stock system to a polymorphic evolutionary equilibrium, implying
30partial compliance of participating farmers to the agreement￿ s provisions.
In conclusion, the more complex the structure of the legislation and audit
probability is, the more likely is that the evolutionary equilibrium is poly-
morphic, and dependents largely on the initial conditions. With no binding
budget constraint regarding monitoring costs, commitment to legislation
and auditing probabilities along with properly chosen legislative mandate
and non compliance ￿nes can induce full participation and compliance with
the public VA. If these conditions are not ful￿lled or the available budget
is limited then partial participation, partial compliance with multiple equi-
libria and irreversibilities and even ￿ uctuation in the nitrate pollution stock
are possible evolutionary outcomes.
The present paper developed a general framework for analyzing partic-
ipation in and compliance with voluntary environmental agreements. In
this generalized context, the results obtained in this paper might provide
some insights related to the expected e¢ ciency and the long run outcome
regarding participation in and compliance with the EU Nitrate Directive
(91/676/EEC). It seems that the voluntary attainment of the Directive￿ s
target depends on the existence of a credible threat of mandatory regulation
which would imply implementation of action programmes and extension of
vulnerable zones. Crucial to the attainment of compliance is also, accord-
ing to our results, the existence of some non-compliance penalty, or some
mechanism that will e⁄ectively decrease the pro￿ts of noncomplying farm-
ers. More precise analysis and prediction regarding the long-run impacts
of the EU Nitrate Directive requires a model that is more speci￿c to the
Directive￿ s structure and incorporates the principle of the cross-compliance
of aid. This is the following step of ongoing research which would entail a
more speci￿c tailoring to the Directive￿ s structure,.of the general concepts
and mechanism developed in this paper
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In order to characterize the way the STCPS converges to the equilib-
rium the linearization matrixes J around the S-Ss are de￿ned along with
their traces Tr(J) = d_ z
dz + d _ S
dS, determinants Det(J) = d_ z
dz
d _ S




discriminants ￿ = [Tr(J)]
2 ￿ 4Det(J).
Fixed Auditing Probability
The STCPS is de￿ned as:






_ S = nfzev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(￿ q)g ￿ bS
where ￿ = ￿ q￿￿N
C ￿ ￿￿N
v and EeL(￿ q) = ￿ qeL + (1 ￿ ￿ q)eo; and the lin-
earization matrix J is:
J =
"
(1 ￿ 2z)￿ 0
nfev ￿ EeL(￿ q)g ￿b
#
with d _ S
dS < 0 and d _ S
dz < 0. If ￿ q >
l
q then d_ z
dz < 0 for the full compliance
critical point z￿
1. Therefore Tr(J) < 0, while Det(J) > 0. The discriminant
￿ T 0; thus the critical point z￿
1 can be a stable focus or node. The same
conclusion holds for the non-compliance critical point z￿
2 if ￿ q <
l
q:￿
Compliance Dependent Auditing Probability
The STCPS is de￿ned as:






_ S = nfzev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q(z))g ￿ bS
where ￿ = q(z)￿￿N
C ￿￿￿N
v and EeL(q(z)) = q(z)eL +(1￿q(z))eo and
the linearization matrix J is:
J =
"




nfev ￿ EeL(q(z)) + (1 ￿ z)
@q(z)
@z (eL ￿ eo)g ￿b
#
For z￿
1 = 1; Tr(J) 7 0; Det(J) < 0; for z￿
2 = 0; Tr(J) 7 0; Det(J) < 0;
for z￿ = z￿
3 2 (0;1); Tr(J) < 0; Det(J) > 0: Thus z￿
1; z￿
2 correspond
to unstable S-S since the matrix J has at least one positive eigenvalue.
Then the S-S corresponding to z￿
3 is GAS. Since the determinant of the
32linearization matrix does change sign in the interval (0;1) the S-S (z￿
3;S￿
3)
is unique by the index theorem. Since the discriminant ￿ T 0 the partial
compliance S-S (z￿
3;S￿
3) can either be a stable focus, a stable node.￿
Emission Stock Dependent Auditing Probability
The CPSTS is de￿ned as:






_ S = nfzev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q(￿S))g ￿ bS
where ￿ = q(￿S)￿￿N
C ￿￿￿N
v and EeL(q(￿S)) = q(z)eL+(1￿q(z))eo;
and the linearization matrix J is:
J =
"




nfev ￿ EeL(q(￿S))g n(1 ￿ z)
dq(￿)
dS (eL ￿ eo) ￿ b
#
with d _ S
dS; d _ S
dz < 0 and d_ z
dS > 0 for z 2 (0;1); q(￿^ S)￿￿N
C ￿ ￿￿N
v = 0: We
examine the linearization matrix at the following cases:
1. z￿
1 = 1; ^ S < S￿
1 < S￿
2; the CPSTS has two isolated S-S. Furthermore
q(￿^ S) < q (￿S￿
1) =) ￿ > 0: then Tr(J) < 0 and Det(J) > 0: The
S-S z￿
1 = 1 with S￿
1 = nev
b is GAS. The S-S with z￿
2 = 0 is not stable
since Det(J) < 0:
2. z￿
3 2 (0;1); S￿
1 > ^ S > S￿
2 the CPSTS has three isolated S-S. The S-Ss
with z￿
1 = 1; z￿
2 = 0 are not stable since for q(￿^ S) > q (￿S￿
1) =)
￿ < 0; and for q(￿^ S) < q (￿S￿
2) =) ￿ > 0; therefore Det(J) < 0;
at both z￿
1 = 1; z￿
2 = 0: For the point z￿
3 2 (0;1) we have ￿ = 0 and
Tr(J) < 0; Det(J) > 0: Therefore the S-S at z￿
3 is GAS in for z 2
(0;1): Qualitative analysis of the phase diagram in Figure 2b suggests
that z￿
3 is a stable focus, implying that compliance and the nitrate








2 = 0; ^ S > S￿
2 > S￿
1; the CPSTS has two isolated S-S. Furthermore
q(￿^ S) > q (￿S￿
2) =) ￿ < 0: then Tr(J) < 0 and Det(J) > 0: The
S-S z￿
2 = 0 with S￿
2 =
nEeL(q2(￿S))
b is GAS. The S-S with z￿
1 = 1 is not
stable since Det(J) < 0:￿
33Joint Dependence of Auditing Probability on Compliance and nitrate pol-
lution Stock
The CPSTS is de￿ned as:






_ S = nfzev + (1 ￿ z)EeL(q(z))g ￿ bS
where ￿ = q(￿S;z)￿￿N
C￿￿￿N
v ; EeL(q(z)) = q(￿S;z)eL+(1￿q(￿S;z))eo;
￿eo
L = (eL ￿ eo); and the linearization matrix J is:
J =
"
(1 ￿ 2z)￿ + z(1 ￿ z)
@q(￿)
@z ￿￿N




nfev ￿ EeL(q(z)) + (1 ￿ z)
@q(￿)
@z ￿eo






dS > 0 and d _ S
dS < 0; d _ S
dz ? 0 depending on the assumption made about
the slope of the isocline _ S = 0. Along the isocline z = l(S) that determines
the potential z￿
3 S-S, the probabilities ^ q(￿S;z) satisfy the equality ￿ = 0.
Every other combination outside the isocline switches the sign of ￿. In
particular, since
@q
@z < 0 and
@q
@S > 0; for combinations located on the right
of the isocline we have q(￿S;z) > ^ q(￿S;z) and ￿ > 0, while on the left of
l(S) we have ￿ < 0 since q(￿S;z) < ^ q(￿S;z).
Under a su¢ ciently vertical isocline z = l(S); so that the intersection
of z = l(S) with _ S = 0 provides a z￿
3 in the non feasible region of z > 1
to the left of the (z￿
1 = 1;S￿
1) point, the linearization matrix J around the
S-S z￿
1 = 1 gives Tr(J) < 0, and Det(J) > 0 since d _ S
dz ,d _ S
dS < 0, and d_ z
dz < 0.
The full compliance EE is stable. Since the discriminant ￿ S 0 the full
compliance EE z￿
1 can either be a stable focus or a stable node.
Under a ￿ at enough isocline z = l(S) so that the intersection of z = l(S)
with _ S = 0 provides a z￿
3 2 (0;1) the linearization matrix J around z￿
3
has d_ z
dz < 0. In this case Tr(J) < 0, while Det(J) > 0; if d _ S
dz < 0; which
means that the _ S = 0 isocline has a negative slope in the neighborhood
z￿
3: Then the (z￿
3;S￿
3) S-S is an asymptotically stable EE with monotonic or
￿ uctuating approach dynamics. If the S-S is unique in (0;1) then it is GAS
and partial compliance is the ES strategy. If there are more than one S-S
in (0;1); resulting from an _ S = 0 isocline with decreasing and increasing
parts, we expect locally asymptotically stable and unstable EE. Furthermore
if z￿
3 2 (0;1) then the z￿
1 = 1 and z￿
2 = 0 S-Ss are not stable.￿
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Figure 3: Evolutionary equilibria under a general auditing probability




























Figure 4: Multiple equilibria
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